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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ~,, . 
October 31 1975 )JO. aJ.J ~ 
List 1, Sh~et 3 <!l,a,rrl 6y ~ 
N~. 75-260 CFX . Cer~. to CA 5 ~ lil'H, (Wis dom, Simpson, Roney; PC)~-
McDONALD, et al. 
v. 
tJl.,t/A, °"'" ~s1.·,4-
Federal / Civil tinelrl&~ 
fUlfstu-lttdl~ 
~ an SANTA FE TRANSP. CO . , et al. 
l-i.!eor-hfl I 
..iA1J).J..L Jx,J 
Timely 11Mli t:lu-, Uo.dc-~ 
,..1-.AJo~~·-
!J"!" ·m IAllls 4'.dd. """-
Y,o/UM' lcU ~ 11() 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs, two White employees, 
- ~ 
were charged along -
~ - )ch 
~~ with one Black employee with theft from resp company. Petrs OJlL ~ - /~ · were discharged, but the Black employee was not. Petrs brought 
~. ' ·u~ (;.fj-lo wc.u..i suit against the company and the union (also a resp) under 
r (1//0lji;J 
4T ArLrYJs Title VII and 42 U.S . C. § 1981 . The DC (Bue) held that§ 1981 
Wt. -,()= n-r 
OXJ f::lu:i...l 
_.I./)~ 
confers no actionable rights upon White persons, and that petrs 
A~ . had failed to state a cause of action under Title VII because they 
w/WUdLd 
~ - were White and had failed t o allege that they were falsely 
{!kw 





2e FACTS: Petrs were charged along with a Black employee 
with stealing ten cases of anti-freeze. Petrs were discharged 
but t he Black employee was not. Petrs brought suit under Title 
VII an d 42 U.S . C. § 1981 , claiming that the employer had imposed 
a more severe disciplinary punishment on them because of their 
race~ The DC noted that the complaint alleged that the Black was 
equal l y gui lty, and set · the case for trial, reserving the 
ques t i ons o f jurisdiction and whether petrs had engaged in the 
requi s i te Title VII exhaustion. After further pretrial proceedings , 
the DC issu ed a Memorandum Opinion and a Modified Memorandum 
Opini on in which he dismi ssed petr Laird's Title VII action 
a gains t t he union for failure to exhaust EEOC remedies. The 
Modi f ied Memorandum s eems to have gone back, however, on the 
Memorandum 's ruling that petr McDonald had similarly failed to 
exhaust EEOC remedies against the union, compare Memorandum 
Opi nion (petn at 30-31) with Modified Memorandum Opinion (petn 
at 25-26). As to Title VII exhaustion against the company, the 
DC assumed that Laird's claim was tolled by McDonald's grievance 
proceeding (perhaps a questionable point), and noted that various 
o t her exhaustion issues would require an evidentiary hearing. 
The court held, however, that such a hearing was not necessary 
because petrs had failed to state a cause of action under Title 
VII . The DC and CA used virtually identical (brief) language in 
c oming to that conclusion. The discussion by the CA (in its 
en t irety) is as follows: 
\
[A]n employer's dismissal of white employees charged with 
misappropriating company property while not dismissing a 
similarly charged black employee does not raise a claim 





§ 2000e et seq e There is no allegation that the plaintiffs 
were falsely charged. Disciplinary action for offenses not 
cons t ituting crimes is not involved in this case. See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp . v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
Cf . NLRB v . Fanstee l Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 
(1939); Nix v. NLRB , 418 F.2d 1001, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969); 
AIH Machine Tool & Die, Inco v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 190 (6th 
Cir. 1970). 
(petn at 22 - 23) 
In regard to the§ 1981 claim, CA 5 stated: 
I 42 u.s.c.A. § 1981 gives all persons within ~he jurisdiction of the United States the same right to e~al benefit of the laws "as is enjoyed by white citizens.' 
The district court held that this section confers no action-
a l e ri ·hts u on whi te persons, and dismissed t or l ack of 
j uri s 1ction t e im brought by the two white 
plaintiff s. We affirm. 
(petn at 22) 
Both the DC and the CA s tated that there appears to be a split, 
at least a t the DC level and perhaps at the CA level>over whether 
White persons can bring an action under§ 1981. 
3o CONTENTIONS: Pe t rs claim that the lower courts were in 
,/ 
error in holding that Title VII does not protect Whites, citing 
Alexander v. Garnder-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); and Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. 401 U~ S. 424 (1971). They note, inter alia, 
the Court's statement in Griggs, that "Discriminatory preference 
f or any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what 
Congress has proscribed." (401 U.S. at 431). Resps emphasize 
t his Courtfs description of a prima facie case of racial dis-
c1..unination i n hiring i n McDonnell Douglas, in which the first 
s tep was described a s a showing "that he belongs to a racial 
minority" (411 U. S . a t 802). 
The citations i n t he CA's opinion seem to indicate, however, 





be brought to a justifiable dibcharge, and the discharge in this 
case was justified by the theft. Resps pick up on this point, 
citing to the Court 's statement in McDonnell Douglas that 
"Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire 
one who has engaged in ••• deliberate unlawful activity against 
it." (411 U.S. at 803). Petrs note that the existence of a 
justification merely rebuts t he prima facie case, that the cause 
nrust still go to trial on the question whether the justification 
was pretextualo They cite to the s tatement in McDonnell Douglas 
that "Petitioner may justifiab ly r efus e t o rehire one who wa s 
engaged in unlawful, disruptiv e acts against it, but only if 
this criterion is applied alike t o members of all races." (411 
U.S. at 804). 
On the issue of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.Co § 1983, 
petrs claim that the l egislative history of the section, and 
this Court's decisions in cases i nvolving discrimination against 
non-Whites indicate that the section was intended to protect 
Whites from discrimination on account of their race. Petrs 
also state that there i s a confli ct among the lower courts over 
whether Whites are protected from racial discrimination on account 
of their race. 
On the conflict question, resps insist that we eliminate 
those cases that found jurisdic t ion where Whites were discriminated 
against because of their support of Black causes o See,~, 
De Matteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 206 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inco, 396 U.S. 235 (1969) 




- - 5- -
sti ll a conflict among the lower courts over whether§ 1981 
grants a cause of action where a White alleges that he has 
been di scriminated against on account of his race. [See 
Appendix attached hereto for a list of cases , several of which 
a re no t mentioned or are mistated in the petn and responses.] 
The conf lict exists primarily at the district court level, 
but a conflict may be seen as existing between some CA 9 dicta 
( for jurisdiction) and affirrilances without opinion by CA 3 
and CA 4 (against jurisdiction) [See discussion in Appendix]. 
4 . DISCUSSION: Petrs have alleged a case of racial 
discrimination (preferring Blacks is as discriminatory as 
preferring Whites). CA S's apparent view that petrs' failure 
t o assert their innocence bars Title VII recovery is without 
merit . Theft can be a cause for discharge, but the company could 
a lso have a policy,~, of not discharging an employee for 
t he first offense. Petrs claim that one policy (resulting in 
discharge) was applied against them while another (not resulting 
i n discharge) was applied against the Black -- a difference solely 
due to racial differences. The alleged discrimination clearly 
would be prohibited if it were used to disadvantage a Black; 
the case ther~ re squarely presents the question whether Title 
VII protects White employees from racially discriminatory firings ... 
/ t he cas e does not involve, however, discriminatory remedial 
hirings of Blacks). Some interesting questions might have been 
raised had the company alleged that theft 
in firing, and that an exception was made 
automatically results 
Cl$ 0.. ft.,,.. tlJ.. 1.,J M ~ , ~~..J 
for the BlackJrather 





papers indicate) however, the company has offered no justification 
for the differences in treatment (~he record, however, has not 
been filed). The papers do not cite to any CA cases on point, 
but the text of the statute and dicta in innumerable opinions 
certainly indicate that Ti t l e VII was intended to protect Whites 
from racial discrimination (except perhaps that discrimination 
necessary to remedy prior discrimination against other races) . 
In regard to the§ 1981 question, there is a conflict on 
the DC level and perhaps on the CA level. Given the existence 
of Title VII, however, § 1981 is likely to be used only where 
the plaintiff has failed f or some reason to satisfy the 
exhaustion requirements of Title VII. The question is therefore 
perhaps relatively unimportant. 
There are responses by the employer and the union. 







On the side proclaiming that Whites have no cause of action 
under§ 1981 f or dis crimination against them on account of race 
are one case directly so holding,~ Kurylas v. United States 
Department of Agriculture , 373 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1974), 
and a number of cases in which the Whi te did not claim that he 
had been discriminated a gainst on account of his race, but the 
court indicated in dicta that even such a claim would not be 
cognizable,~ Perki n s v . Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md. 1960), 
aff'd without opinion, 285 F . 2d 426 (1960); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, 
~' 366 F. Supp. 205 (N .D. Al a . 1973). Cf. Bale v. United 
Steelworkers of America, 6 E.P. D. ,r 8948 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd 
witho~t opinion , 503 F.2 d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1974). 
On the side finding that§ 1981 does confer jurisdiction 
over such claims are Ho l lander v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 392 
F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975); WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 
365 F. Supp. 577 (M . D. Ala. 1973) ; Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 
1240 (E.D. Mo. 1965) , aff'd in part and remanded in part (without 
reaching the§ 1981 issue), 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971). 
There are also a number of cases in which jurisdiction was found 
to be lacking because t he White p l aintiff failed to allege that 
he was discriminated against on account of his race, but the 
courts, in so holding, stated in dicta that a claim of racial 
discrimination against a White wou ~d be cognizable under§ 1981. 
See, Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956), 
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 959 (1957); N.O.W. v. Bank of California, 
- -
- 5 E.P .D. ,r 8510 (N.D. Cal . 1973) (interpreting Agnew, supra); 
Van Hoomi ssen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ill. 1973); 
Marshall v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union 60, 343 F. 
Supp . 70 (E.D . La. 1972) . 
A conflict at the CA level might be seen between Bale 







CA - 5 -
ffmc...~ \o -- 3 \ -75 
Court Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ..... . ............. , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ..... . .......... , 19 .. . 
L. N. McDONALD AND RAYMOND L. LAIRD, Petitioners 
vs. ,.? 




Rehnquist, J .... . . . . .. ... , . .. . . 
Powell, J .. . ..... . . ... ... , . . .. . 
Blackmun, J .... .. ....... , .... . 
Marshall, J .............. , .... . 
"White, J, , • , , , , • , • • • • • • • •I• • • • • 
Stewart, J ... . ... . ....... , .... . 
Brennan, J ..... . . . ... .. .. , .... . 
6-
JURISDICTIONAL I NOT 
CERT. STATEMENT MERITS MOTION AB- _ 
t---..----+-----r--~-~---+--.---+--~-----1sENT VOT 
0 D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D I N G 
•✓••• ! ••• • !•• • • •I • • •• 
-✓-
.. • • • • I •• • • I • •• •I · . •• 
·; •· · .. , .... 
.✓.,:✓-:1J: 
Douglas, J . . . ............. 
1 
.... . 









~u.pumt (!}curl cf tqc~nitt~ ~htftg 
~a.alp.ttgton, ~- <!J. 20?)!.,',l 
March 3, 1976 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONFERENCE 
-
1fl-
Subject: No. 75-260, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 
The Chief Justice has requested confirmation of a Law Week 
report that the USDC has reversed its position in McDonald v. Santa 
Fe Trail Transportation Co. , a case~nte_g__ this term. An inquiry 
addressed by the Clerk's Office to the DC-confirms ffie substance of 
the Law Week report. 
Summary: On November 3, 1975, the Court granted certio-
rari to CA 5 (P,;_£., Wisdom, Simpson, Roney) to review its affirm-
ance of a USDC (SD Tex.) (Bue) ruling that 42 U.S. C. §1981 is 
inapplicable to white citizens. On January 29, 1976, Judge Bue 
held in Spiess v. C. Itoh and Co. that, based on the legislative 
history of §1981, that statute provides full remedies for all persons, 
including white citizens, for redress· of the effects of racial dis-
crimination. 1 / 
According to the report in Law Week, in his Spiess op1mon 
Judge Bue felt constrained to review and restate his position in 
McDonald. In McDonald, the DC, without benefit of CA precedent 
or submission of the legislative history of the statute, followed the 
more numerous DC authorities and concluded that whites lacked 
standing to bring suit on their own behalf under §1981. In light of 
the pertinent legislative history (see, Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D Conn., 1975)), Judge Bue reassigned and 
reversed the position he had taken in McDonald. The DC noted that, 
in McDonald, CA 5 likewis e.,_ had made its evaluation of the §1981 
question without b ~ne h t of the legis la tive his tory. -
Discussion: McDonald also presents the question whether 
Title VII, 42 U.S. C. A. §2000e, ~ ~- protects white employees 
from racially discriminatory firings. 
1 Ci~ d£-~ M~ 
suCkerman Goltz (.le,-
!_/See, 44 U.S. L. W. 2379 (February 24, 1976). 
• 
I",, ... 
- ~ · 
CHAMB E RS O F 
-
~u.p-rtnu> <!Tou:rl trf t[rt ~ b ~taftg 
'lllas!yingtcn.19. <!I• 20-ffeJ!-_;J 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN , .JR. March 2, 1976 
-
-
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 75-260 McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co. 
On November 3 last we granted certiorari in the above 
to review the Fifth Circuit's summary affirmance of a 
District Court holding that white employees have no stand-
ing to sue under the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981. 
Attached is a Law Week report of a decision by the same 
District Judge stating that he has concluded he was wrong 
in McDonald and that white citizens do have standing to 
sue under Sec. 1981. Does this indicate that we should 
vacate our grant of certiorari, vacate the Fifth Circuit's 
judgmen t and remand for consideration of this development? 
W.J.B. Jr. 
Justice Powell --
I don't see why this Jex changes the situation. We still 
have jurisdiction over the case. The Fifth Circuit affirmed 
his decision in MHEx~E McDonald and that is now the law of 
the circuit. He may have- changed his mind, and it is possible 
that we could send it back to him to change the decision. 
But that is a very strange procedure -- equivalent to a judge 
reopening a case months after it was finally decided merely 







CHAMBERS O F 
-
~ ttvr t me <!f o-url of t~ t %n±tll ~htlts 
111asfrin.gfon. tB. QI. 20ffe'~~ 
JUSTICE W M. J . BRENNA N , JR. March 2, 1976 
~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 75-260 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trans portation Co. 
On November 3 last we granted certiorari in the above 
to review the Fifth Circui t's summary aff~ rmance of a 
District Court holding that white employees have no stand-
ing to sue under the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981. 
j 
Attached is a Law Week report of a decision by the same 
District Judge stating that he has concluded he was wr ong 
in McDonald and that white citizens do have standing to 
sue under Sec. 1981. Does this indicate that we should 
vacate our grant of certiorari, vacate the Fifth Ci rcuit's 
j udgment and remand for consideration of · this development? 
W.J . B. Jr. 
~ • •-76 
feat the judicial priviJege.-Coleman, 
Ch.J. 
- TexCLCivApp lstAppJudDist; But-
ler v. Lilly, 1/29/76. 
Civil Rights 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-
• TT1e United Stat,es LA \V WEEK 
that Section 1981 is inapplicable to 
white citizens. McDonald v. Santa 
Fe Trail Transportation Co., Civil Ac-
tion No. 71-H-891, affirmed per cur-
iam, 513 F .2d 90 (CA 5), ,cert. grant-
nd restate its position on that case. ~
' 43 U.S. 923, 43 LW 3263 (1975). 
nee McDonald presently awaits full 
view by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
is court feels compelled to review 
1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. In McDonald, this court could find 
§ l 981, which gives "all persons" no allegation of racial discrimi-
s:im e legal rights as are "enjoyed by nation on the face of the com-
white citizens," creates cause of ae- plaint. Thus, this court could have 
tion on behalf of white citizens who dismissed the Section 1981 claim for 
are discriminated against on basis of failure to state a claim pursuant to 
their race. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6). But, the court 
The 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. be_came aware of . ~he split of dis-_ 
§ 1981, provides as follows: "All per- t:ict court ~uthor!tie~ on the q'.1es -
sons within the jurisdictions of the t1on of the standing of Caucasians 
United States shall have the same to bring s'.1it on their_ own behalf 
right • • • to make and enforce con- under Sect10n 1981. \,Y_1t.hoµt prece.-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evi- dent from the court:s ?f a eals and 
dence, an d to the full and equal . ..!; ene i o subm1ss1on of t e e~-
benefit of all Jaws and proceedings islabve history of the statute, this 
for the security of persons and prop- ~utt ,1~llowed the more numerous 
erty as is enjoyed by white T uthonbes and held that $eCLitm 
• • •,, CJ izens, 1981 was inapplicable to white citi-
A careful review of the legislative 
hi story of this statute leads this court 
-
he conclusion that Congress in-
ed: (a) that white citizens have 
ding to sue under Section 1981; 
and (b) that they be able to state 
a claim upon which relief could be 
granted as to them solely by alleg-
ing discrimination against them on 
the basis of their Caucasian race. 
The statute establishes the principle 
of equal treatment; all persons re-
gardless of race have certain rights 
that are to be protected from 
abridgement by racial discrimina-
tion. The phrase "as is enjoyed by 
white citizens" does not diminish the 
impact of this far-reaching princi-
ple. At most, this phrase constituted 
a comparative instrument by which 
to measure the relative protection 
accorded to all persons, including 
white citizens, in the exercise of 
rights then enjoyed solely by white 
citizens. 
In several recent cases, white citi-
zens have been granted standing to 
sue under Section 1981 on the theory 
that racial discrimination motivated 
by anti-black feeling but directed 
against whites should be actionable. 
See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 
Inc., 396 U. S . 229 (1969). However, 
only a few courts have held that 
white citizens possess the ability to 
'
te a claim _on their own behalf 
ly on the basis of an allegation 
racially discriminatory treatment 
against them as whites. Concluding 
that the statute was meant only to 
eleYate blacks to a level of parity 
Ki th whites, most courts have pro-
hibited actions brought by white cit-
izens. See Perkins v. Banster, 190 
zens. The appearance qf Hollander 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F.Supp. 
43 LW 2427 m Conn 1975) 1 with 
rev1 the le islative history, 
gered this court's rea e f 
S U . is now O VlOUS that 
the spirit and intent of ec on 1981, 
despi LE I cs literal terms, provide full 
reZi;m;~ 7:or all persons. mc)udjng 
w i e I izens, for :er:;; ~f the ef-
.ljtLS 01 facial discri ·l'L ·o 
The U. s. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed this court's 
dismissal of McDonald's Section 1981 
cause of action. Ordinarily, this court 
would feel compelled to follow the 
Jaw as pronounced by the Fifth Cir-
cuit. But this is not an ordinary case. 
It is apparent that the le gislative 
history of Section 1981 mandates a 
reassessment of this court's McDon-
ald holding, in which legal reasoning 
was employed and ·advanced without 
benefit of the statute's legislative 
history in ruling upon a motion to 
[:
1:li smiss. The Fifth Circuit's affirm-
ance of McDonald was similarly 
based upon such an evaluation.-Bue, 
~ . 





sion's preemption of state common 
carrier regulation of cable system 
leased access channels for two-way, 
point-to-point, non-video communi-
cations exceeds its jurisdiction over 
broadcasting. 
4-4 L\V 2379 
standard and !ts application to a set 
of facts that differs in some respects 
from those in U. S. v. Southwestern 
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) and 
U. S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S. 
649, 40 LW . 4626 (1972). 
In determining whether there is 
commission jurisdiction over activi-
ties on the basis of their relation ship 
to broadcasting, it is necessary to 
weigh the statutory purposes served 
by allowing such jurisdiction against 
those that would thereby be im-
paired. Thus, it is appropriate to in-
quire whether any statutory com-
mandments are directly contravened 
by the asserted preemption of state 
power over these two-way, non-video 
communications by cable. · 
Section 152(b) of Title 47 explicitly 
denies commission jurisdiction over 
intrastate common carrier operations, 
except as Section 301 may dictate to 
the contrary. This court finds that 
the substantial bulk of the two-way, 
non-video communications expected 
to be carried over leased access band 
width will be both intrastate and 
common carrier in nature. The plain 
meaning of Section 152 (b), therefore, 
seems to bar the commission's asser-
tion of a general preemptive power 
over ·an uses of access bandwidth. 
Whether the context of the Com-
munications Act taken as a whole 
calls for a different result will be 
considered next. 
The commission justifies its pre-
emptive action as being within a 
general grant of jurisdiction over ca-
ble TV, which has been recognized by 
the Supreme Court in U. S. v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157 (1968), 
and U. S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 
U. S. 649, 40 LW 4626 (1972). 
In Southwestern Cable Co., the 
Court upheld an FCC order restrict-
ing the area in which a cable com-
pany might operate. The order was 
upheld under a residual delegation . 
of authority to the FCC found in Sec- ' 
tion 152(a) of the Act. This authority 
was carefully "restricted to that rea-
sonably ancillary to the effective per-
formance of the commission's various 
responsibilities for the regulation of 
television broadcasting." In Midwest 
Video Corp., a sharply divided Court 
upheld an order requiring certain 
cable operators to facilitate and trans-
mit locally originated productions. 
Four members of the Court concluded 
that the origination requirement was 
within the range of FCC powers rea-
sonably ancillary to broadcasting. The 
deciding vote, cast by . the Chief Jus-
tice, relied primarily on the pervasive 
and open-ended jurisdiction that 
Congress had conferred upon the FCC. 
This court is not convinced that 
either the statute or the construction 





CHAM BERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
• -.§u:µr mu QJourl of tlrt 'Janit.th .§mus 
'J!frurJrnghm, ~- QJ. 2llp'!,~ 
March 5, 1976 
No. 74-6293, Goldberg v. United States 
Dear John, 
I should appreciate your adding my 
name to your concurring opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 












Mr. Justice Powell 
Phil Jordan 
DATE: April 8, 1976 
No. 75-260 McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation 
·M ---
CA5 held (1) that petitioners had failed to state a 
claim under Title VII, and (2) that, as whites, they are not 
protected by§ 1981. Thus, as to the two statutes, the 
order of the questions facing the Court seems to be different. 
{1> As to Title VII, the Court first must decide whether 
petitioners' allegations give them a cause of action; if the 
answer •is positive, then the question becomes whether Congress 
in Title VII intended to protect whites~ As to§ 1981, the 
Court first must decide whether Congress intended to protect 
whites; if the answer is positive, then the question becomes 
whether petitioners' allegations give them a cause of action. 
My recommendation is that you vote (1) that there is a 
cause of action under Title VII, (2) that whites are protected 
by Title VII, (3) that whites are protected by§ 1981, and (4) 
that the Court need not decide whether these allegati~ns make 
out a claim under § 1981. 
Because it makes the discussion easier, I shall discuss 
the Title VII issues in the reverse order from the way they 




- - 2. 
I. Protection of Whites by Title VII 
All parties and amici a epea,!., to agree that whites are 
'--- ------- . -- -
protected by Title VII. Unlike the situation with§ 1981, 
~ 
---see infra, the plain language of Title VII pretty well settles 
~ ws cs> C :css C 
the issue: 
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a). It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer --
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin .... 
Moreover, the two indicia of Congressional intent usually 
considered in addition to the plain language, i.e., legis-
lative history and interpretation by the administrative agenc! J -
------ ..rU,t,?1·-
charg ed with enforcement, both ~ he "standing"7'" of,,,,,, -4..;,~ 
whites under Title VII. The legislative history on the point v~>~ 
understan 
of the bill 
parse. Senator Williams stated that opponents 
should realize that to hire a Negro solely because 
he is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as 
much as a "white only" employment policy. Both 
forms of discrimination are prohibited by Title VII 
of this Act. 




itle VII and 
The issue is 
are protected 
this memo, it 
Griffiths, Brief for Petitioner 13, also 
the parties speak of whites' "standing" under 
under§ 1981, the term is misused in this context. 
ot "stailliing" in any sense, but whether whites 
oycl:ies-t atutes. Whenever I use "standing" in 




- - 3. 
indicates coverage of whites. Several parties and amici also 
emphasize excerpts from the Cl ark-Case Memorandums trnt were 
involved in Franks v. Bowman; I am inclined to discount these 
a little, but they are relevant. Finally, the AFL-CIO even 
notes that Congress got side-tracked onto questions of whether 
the Harlem Globetrotters could remain all-black, and whether 
the movie industry could require black actors for black screen 
parts. Amicus Brief for AFL-CIO 22 n. 33. While that is not 
the kind of legislative history that looks good in an opinion, 
it does show Congress' assumption that Title VII covered 
discrimination against whites . 
The EEOC, charged with interpreting and enforcing Title /~ 
VII , has held that it covers discrimination against whites. 
See 2 e.g., Brief for Petitioners 11. 
Finally, this Court in Griggs, 401 U.S., at 431, stated 
that Title VII proscribed "discriminatory preference for any 




states, any decision that Title VII does not protect 
"would be unsupportable." Brief for SG as Amicus 9. 
II. Title VII Cause of Action 
A. The Facts. 
The first order of business on this issue is to decide 
exactly what state of facts the Court must deal with, since 
the parties disagree. Petitioners and the SG contend 







- - 4. 
that the claim is simply that a black charged with theft was - - -
not discharged while whites charged with theft were discharged . 
Respondent Santa Fe contends that we should look to all the 
papers that were before the DC when it dismissed the complaint 
pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion, because the DC "might" have 
treated the motion as a motion for summary judgment and thus 
itself have considered all the papers. Santa Fe wants all the 
papers considered because some answers to interrogatories, 
taken before the 12(b)(6) motion, indicate (1) that one of 
the two whites was not discharged for suspected theft, but 
because of dereliction of duties, and (2) that the black was 
never charged with theft. See Brief for Santa Fe 8-9. I 
strongly recommend that the Court consider only the complaint, 
an 
and decide whether a Title VII claim is made out by/allegation - - .. 
that a black, charged with the same misconduct as whites, was 
~ .,. 
not discharged although the whites were discharged. Respondent 
~ --Santa Fe, despite its argument early in the brief that more 
than the complaint should be considered, actually argues the 
case later in its brief on the assumption that the complaint 
states the facts - thus conceding, in effect, that its earlier 
contention about the need to consider other papers is largely 
proforma. 
It should be noted that dealing with the case in these 
simple terms - that a black was punished differently although 
he was charged the same as whites - makes irrelevant the 
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of theft. See Brief f or Petitioners 18 n. 37. Even if the -thievery was admitted, the fact would remain that the black 
received different treatment. (Santa Fe does note that 
there is "nothing in the record to indicate" the black fai].ed 
to contest the accusation of theft. Brief for Santa Fe 3. That 
is similarly irrelevant on my view of the case.) 
B. The Law. 
Both sides claim that your decision in McDonnell-Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) controls this case. But 
each side contends that McDonnell-Douglas supports its own 
jj position. I am convinced that any fair reading of McDonnell-
The 1 only reason respondents V[ Douglas supports petitioners. 
are able to argue from that case is that the factual situation 
presented by this case differs significantly from McDonnell-
Douglas. Nevertheless, the principles of the case support 
petitioners. 
In McDonnell-Douglas, you stated that a "prima facie" 
Title VII claim could be made out by showing that a qualified 
minority applicant was rejected when he applied for a position 
for which the employer in fact had an opening . 411 U.S., at 
802. Once the prima facie case was established, the employer 
could rebut by showing "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee's rejection." Id. If the employer met that 
r 
burden, then the onus shifted back to the applicant to show 
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fact was a pretext behind which hid a discriminatory motive. 
Id., at 804. 
Thus, you recognized three "stages" in McDonnell-Douglas. 
First, the alleged discriminatee had to show that he was 
qualified but didn't get the job. Then, the employer had 
to come forward with a nondiscriminatory reason. Finally, 
the alleged discriminateehad to show that the apparent non-
discriminatory reason was not the real reason, and that the 
real reason was a discriminatory motive. 
In the instant case, the three stages are "compressed" 
into one, and this allows the parties to pick out different -"points" within the three stages and argue for one result or 
the other. The stages are "compressed" because of the form 
of the complaint. Petitioners' complaint says, in effect, 
that they were discriminated against because they were treated 
differently from the black, even assuming that the employer had 
a valid nondiscrim~natory reason (the thievery) for firing 
both the petitioners and the black. In short, petitioners -- --
admit the existence of a seemingly nondiscriminatory reason 
for their firing (which would be something the employer 
normally would have to prove in stage 2 of a case), but allege 
that the reason is shown to be a pretext because of the 
different treatment accorded the black. Petitioners' complaint 
goes straight to stage 3 of the McDonnell~Douglas paradigm. 
Petitioners are on solid ground in going straight to 
stage 3 to make out the cause of action. In McDonnell-Douglas 
-
• - 7. 
you noted that one way for the plaintiff in that case to 
show that the employer's asserted reason for refusing to 
rehire him - participation in the "stall-in" - was a pretext, 
would be to show that other equally culpable persons had been 
treated more leniently: 
-1.t,,c.,t,1~~ Especially relevant t o such a showing [of pretext] 
,,v- / would be evidence that white employees involved 
J;i~ in acts against [the employer] of comparable 
~ , seriousness to the "stall-in" were nevertheless 
~
1
.,uv ~ retained or rehired. [The employer] may justifiably 
,.,...- _. refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, 
~ disruptful acts against it, but only if this 
())J,.~' criterion is applied alik e to members of all 
races. 411 U.S., at 804. 
-
-
Petitioners allege exactly that which you stated would be 
-- ____.., -- - - -- - ---- ~ I 
"especially relevant" to a showing that the reason given ------------ ----for adverse employment action was actually "pretext." 
It should be noted that finding a cause of action in 
this case comports with the labor board's practice under the 
NLRA. As the AFL-CIO notes in its amicus brief, the Board 
looks behind seemingly valid reasons for adverse actions to 
--- - ""'--
see if they are mere pretexts for anti-union bias. This is - '-
done even when the seemingly valid reason involves criminal 
conduct, such as the charges of theft in the instant case. 
This makes sense, for if the employer treats two people 
differently although both are equally culpable, it is at least 
prima facie evidence that the employee's culpability is not 
enough - inthe employer's own estimation - to warrant the 
adverse action that was taken. Otherwise, he would have 







employer, of course, can rebut the resulting inference of 
discrimination by showing the existence of mitigating factors 
in the case of one, but not both, employees. See generally 
AFL-CIO Brief as Amicus 26-28. 
The respondents' counter-arguments are rather weak. 
The main one seems to be that an employer should not be forced 
to choose between firing no thieving employee or firing all 
~ 
c:mpJ.uyc:c:::,. l.'\.t::::.puuuc:111..::, 1,,..:uu1..c:uu 1..ua.1.. 1..uc: c:111pJ.uyc:.1. ~ 
l ----- -- ~ 
thieving e-- 1 ~--~ ~ ~ Respondents contend th t the em loyer 
~ "selectively merciful." This is a __ ,.,~ 
l --- , --.. ,·-~ 
should be allowed to be
very curious argument, given the existence of the anti- ~ ./-o ,L.,,, 
discrimination policy of Title VII. The very purpose of that 
Act is to disallow such "selective treatment" if racial 
discrimination is involved, and respondents' argument would 
make it absolutely impossible to determine in any given case 
whether there was such discrimination. If the employer wants 
to be "selective" in his punishment, and his selectivity 
happens to result in blacks and whites receiving different 
treatment, the employer must come forward with some 
justification for the selectivity that will rebut the natural 
inference of discrimination. 
0 ·~ Respondent Santa Fe also makes a broad "philosophical" 
~~ argument that it is impossible to avoid discriminating against 
e, ~ whites if employers are going to help blacks recover from 
k, / past discrimination by "giving them breaks" or engaging in 






which it defines as the "invidiousness" standard: any 
discrimination against a black is presumptively invidious 
9. 
and violative of Title VII; but discrimination agaiost whites 
that results from affirmative action in favor of blacks, or 
that is isolated rather than part of a pattern of anti-white 
discrimination, is not invidious. See Brief for Santa Fe 16-22. 
This "invidiousness" standard is unworkable and cannot 
----. - ----- -be squared with the plain language of Title VII. The Court -
simply has to demand that employment decisions be absolutely - - - ---- -race-neutral to the extent possible. That is, in the abstract -
an employer must make all decisions on the basis of factors 
other than race. Affirmative action programs normally will 
be instituted only after some finding of past discrimination 
against blacks - it may be possible to uphold them against 
claims of "reverse discrimination" · on the ground that they 
are "remedial" and essential. Whatever eventual accommodation 
might be worked out between affirmative action and claims of 
/ / reverse discrimination, it must start from the premise that 
any kind of racial discrimination - anti-black or anti-white 
or whatever - is bad. 
-
The respondent Local 988 makes its own separate plea 
for some kind of special rule in the case of thefts while on 
the job. The union complains that these cases are particularly 
difficult for it in grievance proceedings, and that it should 
not be forced to make a choice between defending all employees 
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the freedom to try to save one employee's skin at the expense 
of others'. See Brief for Local 988, at 8-12. The answer to -
the union's argument is the same as the answer to Santa Fe's --- -~
similar argument that it should not be forced to choose 
between firing no thieves or firing all thieves: the union 
can justify its selective defense of thieving employees by 
showing some valid non-racial reason for its decision to help 
one employee more than another, but unless it shows such 
reason an inference of racial discrimination must arise if 
Title VII is to have any teeth. 
III. Protection of Whites by§ 1981 
Two separate issues must be kept straight under this 
heading: (1) had Congress the power in 1866, when§ 1981 
was passed in its original version, to protect whites against 
racial discrimination; and (2) did Congress in fact intend 
to protect whites by 1981. 
A. Constitutional Power. 
When§ 198l _was passed as part of§ 1 of the 1866 Civil -- "-"""-
Rights Act, there was a Thirteenth Amendment but no Fourteenth 
Amendment. Thus, while Title VII's coverage of whites can 
r--
be based upon the Fourteenth Amendment (or the Commerce Clause, 
as in fact it was), if§ 1981 covers whites it does so on the 
authority of the Thirteenth Amendment. (The act that later 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, but at the time it first was passed, 
Congress' authority had to rest on the Thirteenth.) 
I have no trouble finding that the Thirteenth Amendment -- - --gave Congress power to protect whites as well as blacks. The 
...,_ ----
quest ion has not been discussed directly in a previous case, 
but statements in previous opinions indicate the Court 
always has assumed such power in Congress under this amendment. 
See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1906). 
See generally Brief for AFL-Cio as Amicus 18 n. 29; Brief 
for Anti-Defamation League as Amicus 9 & n. 3; Brief of 
Chamber of Commerce as Amicus 4-5. None of the parties has 
pointed out anything that indicates the Thirteenth Amendment 
was not intended to protect whites as well as blacks from 
slavery and its badges. 
B. Intent in§ 1981. 
Whether Congress in the 1866 Act, now§ 1981, intended 
to protect whites is, for me, a close question. As noted 
at the outset, however, I tentatively recommend that you vote 
that whites are protected. 
Unlike the case with Title VII, where the words of the 
statute virtually compel the conclusion that whites are 
covered, the
11
language ' of§ 1981 points in the opposite direction. 
- ---- --------
) 
Section 1981 on its face appears intended to bestow rights on 
all races except the white race, and the rights it appears to 
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rights that white p·ersons already have independently of § 1981. 
Thus, if§ 1981 is to be held to protect whites, the holding --------------~--------------- --
must be based on the legislative history rather than the 
- - - -
plain words of the statute. 
-
First, the inclusion of the phrase "as is enjoyed by 
/h ,-, ,,,.,__, 
white persons" must be explained. I believe petitioners do 
· explain that fairly adequately, although not entirely satis-
factorily. Their main argument is that the bill as originally 
introduced in the Senate did not include such a phrase, and 
that after the addition of the phrase without discussion in 
the House, the Senate did not consider the phrase to change 
the original reach of the bill. See Brief for Petitioners 31 
(exchange in the Senate between Van Winkle and Trumbull). The 
reason for the phrase, according to petitioners (and the 
SGand the AFL-CIO as amici) was to emphasize the racial 
character of the bill, i.e., to avoid interpretation of the 
bill as outlawing sex or age discrimination. See Brief for 
SG as Amicus 22 n. 12 (Congressman Wilson's explanation that 
"unless these qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, 
those rights might be extended to all citizens, whether male 
or female, majors or minors"); Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus 
13 (remarks, to same effect, of Representative Shellabarger). 
It is no doubt true that the phrase was added simp~y ---to indicate that this was a race bill rather than a sex or 
,,-- -- --minor's rights bill. But this does not explain why the 
- ._.., - -- been 
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for Congress to change the wording around in some other way, 
without using a phrase that suggests rights in everyone except 
whites. That is, the bill could have been changed to say 
something like "All persons, regardless of their race, shall 
have the same rights ... " If a phrase like that had been 
inserted, the statute would be much like Title VII - its plain 
words would suggests its coverage of all racial discrimination 
regardless who is the victim. As§ 1981 actually stands, 
however, the phrase that the House added does suggest 
protection for everyone except whites - and there's very little 
getting around the fact . 
In addition to explaining the inclusion of the trouble-
some phrase, petitioners quote several statements by Congressmen 
and Senators in an effort to show that Congress thought the 
bill would cover whites. The strongest statement was that 
,_. 
of Senator Trumbull, sponsor of the bill, in response to an 
attack upon the bill by Senator Davis: 
"Sir, this bill applies to white men as well 
as black men .... Could anything be more monstrous 
or more abominable than for a member of the Senate 
to rise in his place and denounce ... a bill, the 
only object of which is to secure equal rights to 
all the citizens of the country, a bill that protects 
a white man just as much as a black man?" Brief for 
Petitioners 28-29; Brief for SG as Amicus 21. 
There were several other statements: 
(1) The bill was entitled, throughout its considera-
tion by Congress, a "bill to protect all persons. 
. . . " (emphasis added). 
(2) In his original explanation to the Senate, 
Trumbu ll q~scribed it as a bill to give the same 





(3) Representative Wilson, immediately after 
introducing the phrase "as is enjoyed by white 
persons" as an amendment to the bill, described 
the bill as necessary to protect "our citizens 
. from the whitest to the blackest." 
(4) Representative Shellabarger stated at one 
point that the bill secured rights "to all races." 
(5) After President Johnson vetoed the bill, 
Representative Lawrence emphasized that the bill 
was "not made for any ... race or color .... " 
In the same speech he noted that the minority 
of today could become the majority of tomorrow, 
and that the bill would insure rights to eveyone 
regardless of such shifting majorities. See 
Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus 16-17. 
(6) President Johnson, in his veto me ssage, 
made several statements to the effect that the 
bill was an attempt to create "a perfect equality 
of the white and black races," or to "abrogate 
all State laws of discrimination between the two 
races .... " Brief of AFL-CIO as Amicus 15 . 
14. 
All of these statements support the view that Congress 
intended whites to be covered. Respondent Local 988, however, 
makes a good argument that most of them can be understood as 
expressions of a .~syllogism rather than expressions of an intent 
to protect whites. The syllogism ran like this: (1) the bill 
(the 1866 Civil Rights Act as a whole) makes citizens of 
freedmen; (2) the bill provides that these new citizens shall 
have the same rights and immunities as whites; (3) therefore, 
the bill provides for perfect equality of all citizens of all 
races. Many of the statements~ be read as expressions of 
this syllogism - thus, when a Congressman or Senator spoke 
of there being "no distinction between the white race and the 
black race," he can be understood as doing no more than stating 






Senator Howard). Nevertheless, some of the statements are 
so clear that they can be understood only one way, i.e., as 
'---' 
evidence that the bill was intended to cover whites as well 
as blacks. The most notable example is Senator Trumbull's 
statement, supra, that the "bill applies to white men as well 
~ ~ -
a ~ ack mry." Local 988 argues that that statement was 
"11t h hour histrionics" coming in final debate over the bill, 
and that in earlier, more formal presentations even Trumbull 
had indicated that the bill was intended to protect blacks 
by elevating them to the position of whites. Brief for Local 
988, at 18-19. 
I the 
Respondent Local 988 also makes some telling points on 
side of interpreting§ 1981 as not applying to whites: 
(1) The original version of the first sentence of 
§ 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act referred expressly 
to "persons of African descent." No one ever 
suggested that the bill bestowed any~ rights on 
white persons, while everyone recognized and 
repeatedly remarked that it was bestowing new rights 
on blacks. Moreover, since the bill bestowed only 
certain enumerated rights, it would be somewhat 
anomolous for it to cover whites - they already 
enjoyed all of these rights plus many~-
(2) Section 1, from which§ 1981 is derived, did 
not contain the "as is enjoyed by white persons" 
standard in its original Senate version, but§ 2 
of the bill did contain such a standard in discussing 
the penaltiesand punishments that would be permitted . 
Thus, when the House added the phrase "as is enjoyed 
by white persons" to§ 1, it may have been simply 
synchronizing the two sections - i.e., it may have 
added to§ 1 the standard that already was explicit 
in§ 2. If so, the Van Winkle-Trumbull exchange 
when the bill returned to the Senate can be 
interpreted to mean that the Senate understood 





all along. In other words, it is possible to 
interpret the Senate as thinking, from the 
beginning, that the bill simply conferred new 
rights on blacks and measured those rights by 
the rights of white persons. See Brief for Local 
988, at 15-17. 
(3) The exchange between President Johnson and 
Senator Trumbull over Johnson's veto shows rather 
clearly that both men considered the bill as 
bringing the black race up to the white race. 
The phrases in Johnsons veto message that 
petitioners emphasize, see supra(# 6 of the 
earlier listing in this memo), are seen to be 
consistent, in context, with this interpretation. 
See Brief for Local 988, at 19-21. Especially 
revealing is Trumbull's rejoinder to Johnson that 
all remedial statutes, of which the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act was one, "are for the reliei of the 
persons who need the relief, not for the relief 
of those who have the right already." Id., at 20. -(4) There were comments by Senators and 
Representatives, too numerous to mention, that 
indicated quite clearly their understanding of 
the bill as conferring rights upon freedmen or 
blacks only. These comments are quoted and dis-
cussed in Local 988's brief, at 22-34. 
16. 
I am forced to admit that Local 988's argument against 
coverage of whites is quite strong. Nevertheless, my present - ----- '--inclination would be to hold that§ 1981 does protect whites. 
My thinking is that, while it's probably true that the 1866 
Congress had blacks in mind due to the temper of the times, 
if they had stopped to think about it they would have wanted 
whites to be protected, too. In other words, the Act was 
discussed primarily in terms of nonwhites because nonwhites 
needed the protection right then. But there is no reason 
to think that Congress would not have intended to cover 
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are the quotes discussed earlier that indicate some proponents 
were thinking of whites. 
'
revious 
The counter-argument to my point in the paragraph is 
that there is no need to hold that §1981 covers whites (because 
Title VII covers them now, anyway, as do other anti-discrimina-
tion laws), so why not interpret that statute according to its 
plain words and the possible . intent of Congress at the time? 
In the end, I may be convinced by this counter-argument, myself! 
Finally, I should point out that the decisions in Sullivan 
v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, and Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, do not seem to have~much 
to do with this case. Those decisions allowed white plaintiffs 
to assert rights of blacks, but the cases did not present 
the issue of whether whites had rights of their own under 
§ 1981 or§ 1982. The decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 
169 U.S. 649, discussed by the SG at 17-20 of his brief, seems 
only tangentially relevant. The SG argues by analogy from 
that case, which held that a child born of Chinese nationals 
in this country was a citizen by virtue of another part of 
§ 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (now§ 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). The argument is that since the citizenship part 
of the 1866 Act was held to cover all races despite the 
contention that it was primarily intended to cover blacks, 
so should the rest of the 1866 Act - including§ 1981 -
be held to protect whites. The problem with the argument is 
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phrase "as is enjoyed by white persons," since the person 
involved there was non-Caucasian (Chinese). In this case, 
that phrase keeps haunting me. 
As is obvious from my discussion, I am not "at rest" 
on the question of§ 1981's coverage of whites. We should 
discuss this at some point before Conference. 
IV. Section 1981 Cause of Action 
If the Court decides that whites can sue under§ 1981, 
it should !!:,2£ go farther and decide whether the claim in 
this case comes within§ 1981. That section grants only certain 
enumerated rights - it is not a broad anti-discrimination 
provision like Title VII - and I am not at all certain that 
a discriminatory firing would come within the statute's terms. 
Perhaps such a firing is a denial of the right "to make and 
enforce contracts," but that is an issue best left to the 
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No. 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioners L. N. McDonald and Raymond L. Laird brought 
this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas seeking relief against Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 
(Santa Fe) and International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 988 
(Local 988), which represented Santa Fe's Houston employees, for 
alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S. C. § 1981, 
and of Title VI I of the Civil Rights A ct of 1964, 42 U.S. C. § § 2000e 
et~-, in connection with their discharge from Santa Fe ' s employ-
ment. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In determining 












fi'1!whether a complaint alleging that white employees charged with 
misappropriating property from their employer were dismissed from 
employment, while a black employee similarly charged was not dis-
states ~ claim under Title VI I. SecW.we must decide 
whether § 1981, which provides that "[ a ]11 persons shall have the 
same right ••• to make and enforce contracts .•• as is enjoyed by 
white citizens •••• 11 affords protection from racial discrimination in 
private employment to white persons as well as non-whites. 
I 
Because the District Court dismissed this case on the pleadings, 
we take as true the material facts alleged in petitioners' complaint. 
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, __ U.S. __ , 
slip. op. at 2 (Feb. 25, 1976). On September 26, 1970, petitioners, 
both white, and Charles Jackson, a Negro employee of Santa Fe, were 
jointly and severally charged with misappropriating 60 one-gallon cans 
of anti-freeze which was part of a shipment Santa Fe was carrying for 
one of its customers. Six days later, petitioners were fired by Santa Fe, 
while Jackson was retained. A grievance was promptly filed with Local 
988, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the two 
respondents, but grievance proceedings secured no relief. The follow-
ing April, then, complaints were filed with the Equal Employment 
- -
- 3 -
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging that Santa Fe had discrimi-
nated against both petitioners on the basis of their race in firing them, 
and that Local 988 had discriminated against McDonald on the basis of 
his race in failing properly to represent his interes t s in the grievance 
proceedings, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights A ct of 
I 
I 964. Agency process proved equally unavailing for petitioners, how-
ever, and the EEOC notified them in July 1971, of their right under the 
Act to initiate a civil action in district court within thirty days. This 
suit followed, petitioners joining their § 1981 claim to their Title VI I 
allegations. -----Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, and in June 1974, 
the District Court is sued a final modified opinion and order dis mis sing 
petitioners' claims under both Title VI I and § 1981. Turning first to the 
§ 1981 claim, the District Court determined that § 1981 is wholly inappli-
cable to racial discrimination against white persons , and dismissed the 
claim for want of jurisdiction. Turning then to petitioners' claims under 
Title VI I, the District Court concluded it had no jurisdiction over Laird ' s 
Title VII complaint against Local 988, because Laird had not filed any 
!/ 
charge against Local 988 with the EEOC. Respondent Santa Fe additionall y 
filed 
contended that petit ioners' EEOC complaints against it,/more than ninet y da yi 
'!:_I 
after their discharge, were untimely. Apparently relying upon Fifth Circu i 
- -
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authority for the proposition that the ninety day period for filing with 
the EEOC was tolled during the pendency of grievance proceedings, 
2,./ 
however, the District Court concluded that the question of timely 
filing with the EEOC could not be determined without a hearing on 
petitioners' allegations that they had not been notified until April 3, 
4/ 
1971 , of the termination of the grievance proceedings. But the 
District Court found it unnecessary to hold such a hearing, since it 
concluded, quite apart from any timeliness problem, that "the dismissal 
of white employees charged with misappropriating company property 
while not dismissing a similarly charged Negro employee does not 
raise a claim upon which Title VII relief may be granted." App. 117. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, ~ curiam, 513 
F.2d 90 (1975), noting in regard to the Title VII claim asserted that 
"[t]here is no allegation that the plaintiffs were falsely charged. Dis-
ciplinary action for offenses not constituting crimes is not involved in 




Title VI I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the dis-
charge of "any individual" becaus·e of "such individual's race," § 703(a)(l) , 
42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Its terms are not limited to discrimination 






there confronted with racial discrimination against whites, we 
described the A ct in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971), as prohibiting "[d]iscriminatory preference for any (racial] 
J_! 
group, minority or majority" (emphasis added). Similarly the 
EEOC, whose interpretations are entitled to great deference, Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S., at 433-434, has consistently interpreted 
Title VII to proscribe racial discrimination in private employment 
against whites on the same .terms as racial discrimination against non-
whites, holding that to proceed otherwise would 
11 constitute a dereliction of the Congressional 
mandate to eliminate all practices which operate 
to disadvantage the employment opportunities of 
any group protected by Title VI I, including 
Caucasians." EEOC Decision No. 74-31, 7 FEP 
1326, 1238, CCH EEOC Decisions Y 6406, p. 4084 
(1973).§./ 
This conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the 
effect that Title VI I was intended to "cover all white men and white 
women and all Americans," 110 Cong. Rec. 2579 (remarks of Rep. 
Celler) ( 1969), and create an "obligation not to discriminate against 
whites," id., at 7218 (memorandum of Sen. Clark). See also id., at 
7213 (memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case); id., at 8912 (remarks of 
Sen. Williams). We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial 
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same 




Respondents contend that, even though generally applicable to 
white persons, Title VI I affords petitioners no protection in this case 
because their dismissal was based upon their commission of a serious 
criminal offens·e against their employer. We think this argument is 
,• 
foreclosed by our decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
~I 
supra. 
In McDonnell Douglas, a laid-off employee took part in an illegal 
"stall-in" designed to block traffic into his former employer's plant, and 
was arrested, convicted, and fined for obstructing traffic. At a later 
dat e, the former employee applied for an open position with the com-
pany, for which he was apparently otherwise qualified, but the employer 
turned down the application, assertedly because of the former employee ' s 
illegal activities against it. Charging that he was denied reemployment 
because he was a Negro, a claim the company denied, the former em-
ployee sued under Title VI I. Reviewing the case on certiorari, we 
concluded that the rejected employee had adequately stated a claim under 
Title VI I. See id., at 801. Although agreeing with the employer t hat 
"[n]othing in Title VI I compels an employer to absolve and rehire one 
who has engaged in such delibera t e, unlawful activity against it, " id. , a t 
803, we also recognized that 
"the inquiry must not end there. While Title VI I 
does not, without more, compel rehiring of [the 
former employee], neither does it permit [the 





as a pretext for the sort of discrimination 
prohibited by [the Act]. On remand, [the 
former employee] must ... be afforded a 
fair opportunity to show that [the employer's J 
stated reason for [the former employee's] 
rejection was in fact pretext. Especially 
relevant to such a showing would be evidence 
that white employees involved in acts against 
[the employer] of comparable seriousness to 
the 'stall-in' were nevertheless retained or 
rehired. (The employer J may justifiably re-
fuse to rehire one who has engaged in unlawful, 
disruptive acts against it, but only if this 
criterion is applied alike to members of all 
races. " Id. , at 804 . .!l/ 
We find this case indistinguishable from McDonnell Douglas. 
Fairly read, the complaint asserted that petitioners were discharged 
for their alleged participation in a misappropriation of cargo entrusted 
to Santa Fe, but that a fellow employee, likewise implicated, was not 
so disciplined, and that the reason for the discrepancy in discipline 
ll:_/ 
was that the favored employee is Negro while petitioners are white. 
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). While Santa Fe may 
decide that participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee 
unqualified for employment, this criterion must be "applied, alike to 
members of all races," and that Title VII is violated if, as petitioners 
alleged, it was not. 
We cannot accept respondents' argument that the principles of 
McDonnell Douglas are inapplicable where the discharge was based, as 
petitioners' complaint admitted, on participation in serious misconduct 
< -~ 
'< - ,., ..-; ./!E'!. -
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QI 
or crime directed against the employer. The Act prohibits all 
racial discrimination in employment, without exception for any group 
of particular employees, and while crime or other misconduct may 
be a legitimate basis for discharge, it is hardly one for racial dis -
crimination. Indeed, the Title VI I plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas had - ---.. .!ii 
been convicted for his nontrivial offense against his former em-
ployer. It may be that theft of property entrusted to an employer for 
carriage is a more compelling basis for discharge than obstruction of 
an employer's traffic arteries, but this does not diminish the illogic in 
retaining guilty employees of one color while discharging those of 
]2_/ 
another color. 
At this stage of the litigation the claim against Local 988 must 
go with the claim against Santa Fe, for in substance the complaint 
alleges that the Union shirked its duty properly to represent McDonald, 
but instead "acquiesced and/or joined in" Santa Fe's alleged racial dis-
crimination against him. Local 988 argues that as a matter of law it 
should not be subject to liability under Title VII in a situation, such as 
this, where some but not all culpable employees are ultimately dis-
charged on account of joint misconduct, because in representing all the 
affected employees in their relations with the employer, the Union may 
necessarily have to compromise by securing retention of only some. 





from discriminating on the basis of race among the culpable em-
ployees apply equally to the Union; and whatever factors the 
mechanisms of compromise may legitimately take into account in 
mitigating discipline of some employees, under Title VII race may 
not be among them. Thus, we conclude that the District Court erred 
in dis mis sing both petitioners' Title VI I claims against Santa Fe, and 
petitioner McDonald's Title VII claim against Local 988. 
\ 
III 
Title 42 U.S. C. § 1981 provides in pertinent part that "[ a )11 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... 
~/ 
as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 11 We have previously held, 
where discrimination against Negroes was in question, that § 1981 
affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment 
on the basis of race, and respondents do not contend otherwise. Johnson 
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-460 (1975). See also 
• Runyonv. McCrary, ante, at __ , slip op., at6-13 (1976); Jonesv. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 ( 1968). The question here is 
I 
whether § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment 
D../ 
against whites as well as non-whites. 
While neither of the courts below elaborated its reasons for not 
applying § 1981 to racial discrimination against white persons, respondents 
- -
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suggest two lines of argument to support that judgment. First, they 
argue that by operation of the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens, 11 
§ 1981 unambiguously limits itself to the protection of non-white 
persons against racial discrimination. Second, they contend that 
such a reading is consistent with the legislative history of the pro-
vision, which derives its operative language from § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
See Runyon v. Mccrary, ante, at __ , slip op., at 6-8 n. 8, 9 (1976); 
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973). 
The 1866 statute, they assert, was concerned predominantly with 
assuring specified civil rights to the former Negro slaves freed by 
virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment, and not at all with protecting 
the corresponding civil rights of white persons. 
We find neither argument persuasive. Rather, our examination 
of the language and history of § 1981 convinces us that the courts below 
erred in concluding that § 1981 is inapplicable to racial discrimination 
in private employment against white persons. 
First, we cannot accept the view that the terms of § 1981 exclude 
its application to racial discrimination against white persons. On the 
contrary, the statute explicitly applies to "all persons" (emphasis added) , 
including white persons. See, ~-, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 
169 U.S. 649, 675-676 (1898). While a mechanical reading of the phrase 
- , ...... -
- 11 -
is is enjoyed by white citizens" would seem to lend support to respon-
~nts' reading of the statute, we have previously described this phrase 
lmply as emphasizing "the racial character of the rights being pro-
~cted, 11 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966). In any event, 
hatever ambiguity there may be in the language of § 1981, see note 
7 supra, is clarified by an examination of the legislative history of 
1981 's language as it was originally forged in the Civil Rights A ct of 
366. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972); 
nmigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 218 
. 966). It is to this subject that we now turn. 
The bill ultimately enacted, as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
as introduced by Senator Trumbull of Illinois as a "Bill to protect all 
ersons in the United States in their civil rights .•• 11 (emphasis added), 
nd was initially described by him as applying to 11 every race and color. 11 
ong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 211 (1866) [hereafter Cong. 
~/ 
lobe]. Consistent with the views of its draftsman, and the prevail-
1g view in the Congress as to the reach of its powers under the enforce-
1.J.../ 
1ent section of the Thirteenth Amendment, the terms of the bill 
rohibited any racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of 























is abominable and iniquitous and unconstitutional! 
Could anything be more monstrous or more 
abominable than for a member of the Senate to rise 
in his place and denounce with such epithets as 
these a bill, the only object of which is to secure 
equal rights to all citizens of the country, a bill that 
protects a whit e man just as much as a black man? 
With what consistency and with what face can a 
Senator in his place here say to the Senate and the 
country that this is a bill for the benefit of black 
men exclusively when there is no such distinction 
in it and when the very object of the bill is to break-
down all discrimination between black men and white 
men?" Cong. Globe, p. 599 (emphasis supplied). 
So advised, the Senate passed the bill shortly thereafter. Cong. Globe, 
pp. 606-607. 
It is clear, thus, that the bill, as it passed the Senate, was not 
limited in scope to discrimination against non-whites. Accordingly, 
respondents pitch their legislative history argument largely upon the 
House's amendment of the Senate bill to add the "as is enjoyed by whit e 
citizens" phrase. But the statutory history is equally clear that that 
phrase was not intended to have the effect of eliminating from the bill 
the prohibition of racial' discrimination against whites. 
Congressman Wilson of Iowa, Chairman of the Judiciary Com-
mittee and the bill's floor manager in the House, proposed the addition 
of the quoted phrase immediately upon the introduction of the bill. The 
change was offered explicitly to technically "perfect" the bill, and was 
accepted as such without objection or debate. Cong. Globe, p. 1115. 
- -
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That Wilson's amendment was viewed simply as a technical 
adjustment without substantive effect is corroborated by the structure 
of the bill as it then stood. Even as amended the bill still provided 
that "there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities 
among citizens of the United States in any State or Territory of the 
United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
'?:l:_/ 
slavery. 11 To read Wilson's amendment as excluding white persons 
from the particularly enumerated civil rights guarantees of the Act 
would contradict this more general language; and we would be unwilling 
to conclude, without further evidence, that in adopting the amendment 
'!:.]_/ 
without debate or discussion, the House so regarded it. Moreover, 
Representative Wilson's initial elaboration on the meaning of Senator 
Trumbull's bill, which immediately followed his securing passage of 
the foregoing amendment, fortifies our view that the amended bill was 
intended to protect whites as well as non-whites. As Wilson described 
it, the purpose of the measure was to provide "for the equality of 
citizens ••• in the enjoyment of their I civil rights and immunities. 111 
Cong. Globe, p. 1117. Then, speaking in particular of "immunities, 11 
as "freedom or exemption from obligation", he made clear that the 
bill "secures to citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions 
of the law . • • • Whatever exemptions there may be shall apply to all 






another. 11 Ibid. Finally, in later dialogue Wilson made quite clear 
that the purpose of his amendment was not to affect the Act's protection 
of white persons. Rather, he stated, "the reason for offering [the 
amendment] was this: it was thought by some persons that unless these 
qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, those rights might be 
extended to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minors. 11 
Cong. Globe, House App. p. 157. Thus, the purpose of the amendment 
was simply "to emphasize the racial character of the rights being 
protected, 11 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S., at 791, not to limit its appli-
?.2_/ 
cation to non-white persons. 
26/ 
The Senate debate on the bill as it passed the House and was 
returned to the Senate, likewise emphasizes that Representative Wilson's 
amendment was not viewed as limiting the bill's prohibition of racial 
discrimination against white persons. Senator Trumbull, still managing 
the bill on the floor of the Senate, was asked whether there was not an 
inconsistency between the application of the bill to all "citizens of every 
race and color" and the statement that they shall have "the same right 
•.• to make and enforce contracts ..• as is enjoyed by white persons, 11 
and it was suggested that the emphasized words were superfluous . 
Cong. Globe, p. 1413. Senator Trumbull responded in agreement with 
the view that the words were merely "superfluous. I do not think they 
alter the bill . . • • [A]nd as in the opinion of the [Senate Judiciary] 
r - -
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[C)ommittee which examined this matter, they did not alter the meaning 
of the bill, the committee thought proper to recommend concurrence. • . 11 
Ibid. 
Finally, after the Senate's acquiescence in the House version of 
the bill, Cong. Globe, pp. 1413-1416, and the subsequent veto by 
27/ 
President Johnson, the debate in both the Senate and the House again 
reflected the proponents I views that the bill did not discriminate in 
favor of non-whites. Senator Trumbull once more rejected the view 
that the bill "discriminates in favor of colored persons, 11 Cong. Globe, 
p. 1758, and in a similar vein, Representative Lawrence observed in 
the House that its "broad and comprehensive philant hropy which regards 
all men in their civil rights as equal before the law, is not made for 
any ••. race or color •.• but ..• will, if it becomes a law, protect 
every citizen .•• , 11 Id., at 1833. On these notes, both Houses 
passed the bill by the prescribed majorities, and the veto was over-
ridden. Id. , at 1802, 1861. 
This cumulative evidence of Congressional intent makes clear, 
we think, that the 1866 statute, designed to protect the "same right . 
to make and enforce contracts II of "citizens of every race and color" 
was not understood or intended to he reduced by Congressman Wilson I s 
amendment, or any other provision, to the protection solely of non-
whites. Rather, the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe 
- -
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discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, 
or in favor of, any race. Unlikely as it might have appeared in 186 6 
that white citizens would encounter substantial racial discrimination 
of the sort proscribed under the Act, the statutory structure and 
legislative history persuades us that the Thirty-ninth Congress was 
intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader principle than 
would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and imme-
diate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves. And while the statutory 
language has been somewhat streamlined in reenactment and codifica-
tion, there is no indication that § 198 I is intended to provide any less 
than the Congress enacted in 1866 regarding racial discrimination 
against white persons. Runyon v. McCrary, ante, at __ , slip op., 
at 11-12 ( 1976). Thus, we conclude that the District Court erred in 
dis mis sing petitioners' claims under § I 981 on the ground that the 
protections of that provision are unav ailable to white persons. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consis t ent 





See § 706(e) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(e), as amended, 
42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. IV). This issue is not presented for 
review on certiorari here. 
'?:_I 
Sections 706(a)&(e) of the 1964 Act provided in pertinent part: 
"(a) Whenever it is charged in writing under oath 
by a person claiming to be aggrieved, ..• that 
an employer, employment agency, or labor organ-
ization has engaged in an unlawful employment 
practice, the Commission shall furnish such em-
ployer, employment agency or labor organization 
••• with a copy of such charge and shall make an 
investigation of such charge . . • . If the Commis -
sion shall determine, after such inv estigation, that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge 
is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate 
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by 
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion • 
(d) A charge under subsection (a) of this section shall 
be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred •.•. " 
Amendments to § 706 by § 4(a) of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 104, 42 U.S. C. § § 2000e-5 (Supp. IV), are not 
pertinent to this case. 
2..I 
See Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F. 2d 303 
(1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F. 2d 888 (1970). 
- -
FN - 2 
4/ 
Respondents also alleged that the grievance proceedings 
under the collective bargaining agreement were concluded in October 
1970, so that even assuming the ninety day period for filing with the 
EEOC was tolled until that time, the April 1971 charges were untimely. 
'i.l 
Santa Fe has not questioned the District Court's denial of 
its motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners' Title VII charges 
filed with the EEOC were untimely. While some courts of appeals have 
characterized the ninety day limitation on filing a charge with the EEOC , 
see note 2 supra, as a statute of limitations, cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
8(c), others have described it as "jurisdictional," apparently implying 
that even if not raised by the parties the matter must be reconsidered 
~ sponte by an appellate court, see City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 
U.S. 507, 511 ( 1973); cf. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 12 (h)(3). Compare, ~- , 
Davis v. Valley Distributing Co. , 522 F. 2d 82 7 (CA 9 1975), petition for 
certiorari pending, No. 75-836; S a nchez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
499 F. 2d 1107 (CA 10 1974), with~-, Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 
525 F. 2d 124 (CA 6 1975), cert. granted April 23, 1976, Nos. 75-1264, 
75-12 76; Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F. 2d 35 7, 35 9 (CA 7 
1968). See also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc. , 516 F. 2d 
924 (CA 5 1975 ). We have heretofore taken no position on this is sue. 
~ 
- -
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2,/ cont'd 
We now decide that the question is not a jurisdictional one which we 
must consider sua sponte. Thus, since Santa Fe does not raise the 
timeliness point, we do not address its merits. 
The pas sage of excessive time, like the misplacement of venue, 
see, ~-, Fed. Rule Civ. P. 12(h)( l); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-168 (1939), is ordinarily not a matter 
which displaces the power of a trial court to determine a controversy. 
Cf. United States v. Western Pacific R. Co. , 352 U.S. 5 9 ( 1956). Both 
sorts of limitations on the initiation of suit are ordinarily intended 
merely as statutes of convenience for the benefit of the defendant, and 
which the defendant may be counted upon to raise. Congress is of ----------.... --------------
course capable of enacting time limitations upon the jurisdiction of the 
federal district courts which the courts are obliged, themselves, to 
raise. Notions of sovereign immunity have led us so to regard time 
limitations respecting certain suits against the United States, see 
Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41 (1938); Finn v. United States, 
123 U.S. 22 7, 233 (1887). But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 
764 (1975). See also Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 U.S. 638, 642 
(1918). But in the absence of any particular statutory direction, we 
l have not interpreted a time limitation upon the initiation of suit in a district court as jurisdictional unless strong policies against resolution 
- -
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II cont'd 
of a class of disputes are at stake which transcend any particular 
litigation. 
We find no indication in the statutory language, history or 
policy of Title VII to indicate that the ninety day filing limitation in 
§ 706(d} of the Act was intended to prescribe the sort of limitation 
which an appellate court must be counted on to raise by itself. First, 
nothing in the language of the Act suggests that the limitation is juris -
dictionalinthis sense. See§§ 706(e},(f}, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e},(f} 
.a.s amended, 42 U.S. C. § § 2000e-5(e}, (f} (Supp. IV}. Second, the 
legislative history indicates the limitation was not intended to be a 
jurisdictional bar. The House model for the 1964 Act, H.R. 7152, 
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964}, contained in§ 707(d}, see H. R. Rep. No. 
914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1963}, a six month limitation period, 
which was characterized simply as drawn for the ordinary defensive 
purpose of preventing "stale claims." . 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (inter-
pretative memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case}; id., at 7243 (remarks 
of Sen. Case}. The provision was shortened and substantially reworked 
in the Senate compromise bill, 110 Cong. Rec. 11932 ( 1964}, but there 
is no indication that the Senate version, ultimately enacted, had any 
different policy. On the contrary, it was characterized simply as a 
"period of limitations" rather than a strict jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Id., at 12723 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey} (1964}. Finally, nothing in 
- -
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the policy of the Act requires that the 90-day period be considered 
a strict limitation on the district court's power. To be sure, the 
Act requires that Title VII suits be brought to the Commission before 
they come to the district court, in order that the solution of meritorious 
cases may first be attempted through conciliation rather than litigation. 
But conceding that such prior administrative resort may be a pre-
requisite to a district court's jurisdiction, to be noticed at any time, 
it does not follow that timely administrative resort must be such, for 
the Congressional policy favoring administrative attempts at conciliation 
before suit is filed is not furthered by regarding the filing time as a 
jurisdictional limitation. 
§_/ 
Section 703 of the Act, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2, provides in 
pertinent pa rt: 
"(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer .•. to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
(c) Labor organization practices. It shall be unlaw-
ful employment practice for a labor organization ... 
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate 
against an individual in violation of this section." 
✓ 
- -
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]_/ 
Our discussion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 791, 802 ( 1973), of the means by which a Title VII litigant might 
make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination is not contrary. 
There we said that a complainant could establish a prima facie case 
by showing: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he 
applied and was qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite 
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, 
after his rejection, the position remained open and 
the employer continued to seek applicants from 
persons of complainant's qualifications. 11 (footnote 
omitted). 
As we particularly noted, however, this "specification ... of the 
prima facie proof required .•• is not necessarily applicable in every 
respect to differing factual situations. 11 Id., n. 13. Requirement (i) 
of this sample pattern of proof was set out only to demonstrate how 
the racial character of the discrimination could be established in the 
most common sort of case, and not as an indication of any substantive 
limitation of Title VI I's prohibition of racial discrimination. 
'§_I 
See, ~-, EEOC Decision No. 75-268, 10 FEP 1502, CCH 
EEOC Decisions Y 6452 (1975); EEOC Decision No. 74-106, 10 FEP 
701, CCH EEOC Decisions Y 6427 (1974) EEOC Decision No. 74-95, 
8 FEP 701, CCH EEOC Decisions Y 6432 (1974). None of the Courts of 
Appeals appears directly to have confronted the question. But compare, 
l 
- -
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§_/ cont 1d 
Parks v. Brennan, 389 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1974), rev 1d on other 
grounds sub~ Parksv. Dunlop, 517F.2d785 (CA51975), with 
Haber v. Klassen, 10 FEP 1446 (N. D. Ohio 1975); Mele v. United 
States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 5 92 ( I 975). Cf. also, ~-, 
Patterson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F. 2d 767, 
769 (CA 2 1975). Neither of the courts below articulated a clear stance 
on the issue. 
21 
Local 988 explicitly concedes that it makes no difference that 
petitioners are white and Jackson Negro, rather than the other way 
around. Brief for Respondent Local 988, at 7. Santa Fe, while con-
ceding that "across-the-board discrimination in favor of minorities 
could never be condoned consistent with Title VI I," contends neverthe-
less that "such discrimination ••• in isolated cases which cannot 
reasonably be said to burden whites as a class unduly," such as is 
alleged here, "may be acceptable." Brief for Respondent Santa Fe, 
at 20 (emphasis omitted). We cannot agree. There is no exception in 
the terms of the Act for isolated cases; on the contrary, "Title VII 
tolerates~ racial discrimination; subtle or otherwise." McDonnell 
Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (emphasis added). 
We emphasize that we do not consider here the permissibility 
of employers 1 programs - - judicially required, or otherwise prompted -----------
- -
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J_/ cont'd 
to relieve the present effects of past racial discrimination; there is 
no indication that the actions challenged here were any part of such 
a program, cf. Brief for Respondent Santa Fe, at 19 n. 5. See Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 7 n. 5. 
12._/ 
Both the District Court, App. 117, and the Court of Appeals, 
513 F. 2d, at 90, specifically relied upon petitioners' failure to allege 
that the charge of misappropriating the anti-freeze was false. 
Petitioners assert here that their complain~ should be construed to 
deny culpability, Brief for Petitioners at 18-19 n. 37, but for the 
reasons discussed in text, we need not consider whether the complaint 
can so be read. 
.!.!/ 
The use of the term pretext in this context does not mean, 
of course, that the Title VI I plaintiff must show that he would have 
in any event been reject ed or discharged solely on the basis of his race, 
without regard to the alleged pretextual deficiencies; as the closing 
sentence to the quoted passage makes clear, no more is required to 
be shown than that race was a "but-for" cause. See a l t Albemarle 
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Santa Fe contends that petitioners were required to plead 
with "particularity" the degree of similarity between their culpability 
in the alleged theft and the involvement of the favored co-employee, 
Jackson. This assertion, apparently not made below, too narrow ly 
constricts the role of the pleadings. Significantly, respondents them-
selves declined to plead any dissimilarities in the alleged misconduct 
of Jackson and petitioners, and did not amend their pleadings even 
after an interim order of the District Court indicated it regarded 
petitioners' allegations of racial discrimination as sufficient to raise 
the legal problem of dissimilar employment discipline of "equally 
guilty" employees of different races. App. 92, 94. As McDonnell 
Douglas, supra, indicates, of course, precise equivalence in culpa-
bility between employees is not, in any event, the ultimate question; 
rather, the d egree of equivalence goes only to the strength of the 
inferential showing that the disciplinary decision was made on racial 
grounds rather than some legitimate basis. 
QI 
Local 988 asserts petitioners' alleged misappropriations 
would amount to a felony under Texas law , Tex. Penal Code Ann. 
§ 31.03 (1974), and federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 659. We assume this 
assertion to be true. 
l 
- -
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As we observed in McDonnell Douglas: 
"The trial judge noted that no personal injury or 
property damage resulted from the 'stall-in' due 
'solely to the fact that law enforcement officials 
had obtained notice in advance of plaintiff's •.. 
demonstration and were at the scene to remove 
plaintiff's car from the highway.' 318 F. Supp. 
846, 851. 11 411 U.S., at 803 n. 16. 
12.I 
Local 988 1 s reliance on NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical 
Corp. , 306 U.S. 240 ( 1939), is misplaced. In that case we held only 
that it did not violate the National Labor Relations Act for an employer, 
after lawfully discharging a number of employees for their participation 
in an illegal sit-down strike, to extend reemployment to son1.e, but not 
all, of those discharged employees. We held there that the employer 
"was simply exercising its normal right to select its employees. 11 Jd., 
at 259. There was no suggestion of racial discrimination, or any dis-
crimination based upon legally protected labor activities, in Fansteel, 
however. See also American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 
312 (1965). 
1!:._/ 
The statute provides, in full: 
· "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States . shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
ever y k ind , and to no oth er . 11 
- -
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The lower federal courts have divided on the applicability 
of § 1981 to racial discrimination against white persons. Decisions 
in accord with the holdings below include Bale v. United Steelworkers, 
6 EPD Y 8948 (W.D. Pa. 1973); ~ v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 36 6 F. 
Supp. 205 (N. D. Ala. 1973); Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 
(D. Md. 1960). Decisions in conflict include Carter v. Gallagher, 
452 F. 2d 315, 32 5 (CA 8 1971); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 
392 F. Supp. 90 (Conn. 1975); WRMA Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. 
Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 5 77 (M. D. Ala. 1973); Gannon v. Action, 
303 F. Supp. 1240, 1244-1245 (E. D. Mo. 196 9), aff 1d on other grounds, 
450 F. 2d 1227 (CA 8 1971); Central Presbyterian Church v. Black 
Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 901 (E. D. Mo. 1969) . 
. !JU 
12..I 
Cf. Cong. Globe, p. 4 74: 
"I take it that any statute which is not equal to 
all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights 
where are secured to other citizens, is an unjust 
encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a 
badge of servitude which, by the Constitution, is 
prohibited. 11 ( emphasis supplied). 
See generally, ~-, Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: 
A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. Rev. 1 
( 1974); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
- -
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9 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11-2 9 ( 1955 ). The Court has previously ratified _,,, 
1is view. · Congress is authorized under the enforcement clause of 
1e Thirteenth Amendment to legislate in regard to "every race and 
tdividual." Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1906); 
~e Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S., at 441 n. 78. 
20/ 
The bill's concern with equal protection of civil rights 
r whites as well as non-whites is also expressed in its § 4, which 
ferred, as introduced, Cong. Globe, p. 211, and enacted, 14 Stat. 
(1866), to "protection to all persons in their constitutional rights of 
1ality before the law, without distinction of race or color. 11 The same 
1cern is reflected in the evolution of an amendment offered by Senator 
.1mbull to provide, at the beginning of § 1, "That all persons of 
·ican descent born in the United States are hereby declared to be 
zens of the United States .••• 11 Cong. Globe, p. 474. The amend-
:it, accepted in principle, was itself amended to replace "persons of 
ican descent born in the United States" with "persons born in the 
ted States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians 
taxed, 11 (1866). This provision was ultimately supe.rseded by section 
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After Congressman Wilson's "perfecting" amendments, § 1 
of the bill provided: 
"That all persons born in the United States, and not 
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, 
are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States, 
without distinction of color, and there shall be no dis -
crimination in civil rights or immunities among citizens 
of the United States in any State or Territory of the United 
States on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of slavery; and such citizens of every race and color, 
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
have the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
and penalties, and to none other, any law, sttatute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. 11 S. 61, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., House Print, March 2, 
1866. 
23/ 
The provision generally forbidding "discrimination in civil 
rights or immunities •.. on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of slavery" was ultimately struck from the statute in the 
House. Cong. Globe, p. 1366. This does not affect the analysis here, 
however, for two reasons. First, the debates make clear that the 
grounds for objection to that provision, and the reason for its ultimate 
omission, was the breadth of the terms 11 civil rights and immunities 11 , 
- -
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beyond those specifically enumerated in the second half of § 1, rather 
than an antagonism to the principle of protection for every race. See 
generally Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S., at 791-792; Bickel, the Original 
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11-2 9 
( 1955). Second, the point here is only that acceptance of respondents' 
interpretation of Congressman Wilson's amendment is inconsistent 
with the fact that the general provision against racial discrimination 
regarding civil rights remained in the bill at the time of the amendment, 
.a-nd was not removed until debate had focused on -its particular ambiguities 
more than a week later. 
24/ 
Wilson also urged that the bill should pass 
"to protect our citizens, from the highest to the 
lowest, from the whitest to the blackest, in the 
enjoyment of the great fundamental rights which 
belong to all men. 11 Cong. Globe, p. 1117. 
Wilson's view that the Act applied equally to protect all races 
was echoed by other supporters of the bill in the House, as it had been 
in the Senate. See, ~-, the remarks of Congressman Shellabarger: 
"Its whole effect is to require that whatever rights 
as to each of those enumerated civil •.. matters 
the States may confer upon one race or color of 
the citizens shall be held by all races in equality. 
Your State may deprive women of the right to sue 
- -
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or contract or testify, and children from doing 
the same. But if you do so, or do not so as to 
one race, you shall treat the other likewise .. 
It secures - - not to all citizens, but to all races 
as races who are citizens - - equality of protection 
in those enumerated civil rights which the States 
may deem proper to confer upon any races. 11 
Cong. Globe, p. 1293 (emphasis added). 
See also id., at 1159 (remarks of Rep. Windom); cf. id., at 1118 
(remarks of Rep. Wilson). 
25/ 
Local 988 suggests that the pattern for Wilson I s "as enjoyed 
by white citizens" amendment was similar language in section 2 of the 
Civil Rights Bill which, as introduced by Senator Trumbull, p. 211, 
and enacted, 14 Stat. 2 7, provided in pertinent part that 
"Any person who shall subject ••• any inhabitant 
of any State or Territory ... to different punish-
ment, pains , or penalties .•• by reason of his 
color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment 
of white persons, is to be deemed guilty of a mis -
demeanor, and on conviction to be punished by a fine 
••• or imprisonment . II 
That this may have been the source of the language of the amendment 
hardly explains its meaning. As recited above, the prescriptive portion 
of the bill, § 1, provided, as introduced, see p. ___ , supra, and 
enacted, see n. 2 6, infra, and provides as currently codified, that 
punishments shall be equal for members of all races. Section 2 of the 
- -
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bill is no different, as it crimina lizes the application of "different 
punishment, pains, or penalties" whether greater or less er than 
what white persons would be subject to. Even were we to read 
section 2 of the Act as protecting only non-whites, however, the 
significance of such a conclusion to the interpretation of section I 
would be slight; for we have previously explained that the Thirty-ninth 
Congress apparently intended to apply criminal sanctions only to some, 
but not all, violations of the Act. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S., at 424-425. 
~_/ 
Cong. Globe, p. 1367. Section I of the bill, as it then 
stood, and as it was ultimately enacted, provided in relevant part: 
'!:1_/ 
"That all persons born in the United States, and not 
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not 
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of t he 
United States; and such citizens, of every race and 
color, ••. shall have the same right, in every State 
and Territory in the United States, to make and 
enforce contracts, ... as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and 
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not-
withstanding. " 14 Stat. 2 7. 
In his veto message, President Johnson recognized tha t the 
bill attempted to fix "a perfect equality of the white and black races. 11 
Cong. Globe, p. 1679. 
e 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
.§u:pr.tnu <!Jltllrl !tf tlr.t jlnit.th ~hd.t.&' 
11hurlfiu:ghtn. ~. ~ 2.llffe~, 
June 14, 1976 
✓ 
Re: 75-260 McDonald v. · Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I will probably end up joining most of your 
opinion, I have these problems: 
(1) At present I am not prepared to accept the 
holding in footnote 5. In McDonnel the Court 
characterized the 90-day limitation as a 
"jurisdictional prerequisite," 411 U.S. at 
798; that is, I believe, the unanimous view 
of the courts of appeal; it seems to be re-
quired by the mandatory character of the 
s;atutory language~ 
(2) I think we are kidding ourselves in footnote 
9 to the e~tent that you disavow consideration 
of the validity of a voluntary affirmative 
action program. I agree that a judicially 
required program would not be covered, but the 
reasoning in the text will surely support the 
typical reverse discrimination claim which any 
quota system will stimulate. 
(3) On the basic§ 1981 issue, I agree that the 
words "all persons" mean what they say, but 
I have the same problem with the application 
of this statute to employment discrimination 
that I have in the . private school case. I 
think, however, that the result is controlled 
by stare decisis. 
In all events, I will respond finally as soon as I come 
to rest in Runyon. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 




.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-.§u:p-umt ~curl cf tlrt ~ttlttb .§ta±tg 
~as-lp:ngtcn. ~. ~. 211~)1.~ 
I 
June 14, 1976 
75-260 - Mcdonald v. Santa Fe Co. 
Dear Thurgood, 
Although I share the first two of 
John's three doubts, I am glad to join your 
opinion for the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHA M BERS OF 
.JUSTICE B Y RON R . WH ITE 
- -
j;u:prmt Qiou:rt of tlft ~th .;§htlta 
~ag!pnghm. ~ - Q}. 2llffeJI.~ 
June 14, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please add at the foot of your opinion in 
case the following statement: 
Mr. Justice White joins Par ts I and II 
of the Court's opinion, but for the reasons 
stated in his dissenting opinion in Runyon v. 
McCrary, ante at_·_, he cannot join 
Part III since he does not agree that§ 1981 
is applicable in this case. To that extent 
he dissents. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 




CH AMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-.§u:p-rtmt QJ'ou.rt .of tfyt ~ni.tdt .:§f:ateg 
'Jlras-ltington. lI}. <q. 202)~.;1 
June 15, 1976 ✓ 
RE : No . 75-260 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation 
Com an 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree . 
Sincerely, 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
June 15, 1976 
No. 75-260 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Dear Thurgood: 
I have the same reservation as that expressed by John 
as to the 90-day limitation being a "jurisdictional 
prerequisite". We said it was jurisdictional in McDonnell, 
411 U.S., at 798, although I do not recall that it was an 
issue in the case. Nor, indeed, do I recall this question 
being presented in this case or discussed at Conference. 
A somewhat less eerioua reservation relates to the last 
sentence in footnote 12. I rather hesitate to invite District 
Courts to balance 'culpability" on some "degree of equivalence" 
rationale. I am inclined to think that a Title VII action 
should lie only when there bas been disparate treatment among 
employees engaged in the same action or in the same general 
course of conduct. This ia not a major point with me, but 
on balance I would prefer to omit this sentence. 
Apart from the foregoing, I agree with your opinion. 
I am giving some further thought, however, to the 90-day 
limitation issue which your opinion would have the Court 
decide in footnote 5. 
Sincerely, 




• .:§u;rttttl-C <!}mttt of tlrt ]tnucit j;hl 
'l1Taslrutgt!ltt, l-). <!}. 20biJi-~ 
JU ST I CE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 15, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260 -- McDonald v. Santa Ve Trail Trans. Co. 
Dear John: 
Thank you for your note on the captioned case. I do 
not understand your third point to ask for a response from 
me: but as to the other two, let me suggest the following: 
(1) First, I do not believe McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. 792, '798, or Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 35, 47 (1974) (essentially reciting McDonnell Douglas) to 
have decided whether the 90-day limitation was a non-waivable 
jurisdictional prerequisite. In McDonnell Douglas we said : 
"Respondent satisfied the jurisdictional 
prerequisites to a federal action (i) by 
filing timely charges of employment discrimi-
nation with the Commission and (ii) by receiving 
and acting on the Commission's statutory notice 
of the right to sue ..•. " 
I read that sentence only to say that jurisdiction was secure there, 
not that all the details fulfilled are necessarily jurisdictional. As 
I understood it, the particular phrasing simply served to emphasize 
the next following statement, that an EEOC finding of reasonable 
cause was not a jurisdictional requirement -- but without deciding 
the question presented here, as the Court of Appeals had done below 
(finding timeliness not jurisdictional). 463 F. 2d 337, 343 (CA 8 1972). 
Second, I do not understand that the Courts of Appeals have been 
unanimous in characterizing the 90 day limitations period as a 
non-waivable "jurisdictional" requirement . Besides the 8th Circuit 
statement above, at least the 5th Circuit has specifically left the 
question open, see Reeb v . Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 
516 F. 2d 924 (CA 5 1974); and though these labels are not a great 
deal of help, the 9th and 10th circuits have depicted the 90 day 
period as a statute of limitations, see Davis v. Valley Distributing Co., 
- 2 - -
522 F. 2d 827 (CA 9 1975), cert pending, No. 75-836; Sanchez v. 
TWA, 499 F. 2d 1107 (CA 10 1974). Nor, third, do I think ihe 
particular phrasing of the 90-day limitation means that it must 
be jurisdiciional. "Non-jurisdictional" statutes of limitation are 
frequently phrased in similar language. See Developments in ihe 
Law -- Statuics of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1179 
(1950). (I would also note that the original House version of the 
limitations period in Title VII, was patterned on § l0(b) of the 
NLRA, which we characterized as a "statute of limitations" in 
Machinists Local 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960); and there 
does not appear to be any significance to the rephrasing of the 
limitations period in the Senate compromise bill.) Finally, I 
was at some pains to assure myself before proceeding in this 
case that the 90 day limitation period was not a jurisdictional 
matter, because I thought it inappropriate to attempt a resolution 
of the merits of the question vrhether the limitations period was 
tolled during grievance proceedings. That issue is presented in 
Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., Nos. 7 5-12 64 & 7 5-127 6, to be 
argued next Term, and Davis v. Valley Disiributing Co., ~~!2.£.~, 
held for Guy. Are you suggesting, perhaps, that we might decide 
§ 1981 and hold Title VII over, see Retail Clerks Loca:1 1625 v . 
Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 757 (1 963)? 
(2) As to fn. 9, we agree that a judicially required affirmative 
action program, which is not the subject in this case, is not ruled 
out in my draft. I cannot agree with you, however, that a program 
which a judge can lawfully require is necessarily illegal without a 
judge 's order. If this were true, ihen, among other things, the 
conciliation goal of Title VII, and the EEOC ' s role in implementing 
it, would be much deemphasized, if not ruled out, in many instances 
where they might otherwise be most valuable. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
;%n.prmu <!Jourl Df tlrt ~b ~tatts: 
'cJIJulp:nght14 J. Q}. 2llffe'!~ 
June 16, 1976 
Re: 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
To keep things moving, albeit slowly, I now join in 
the judgment and when I complete some work now in progress 
I may well enlarge the "join''• 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
, -
;inputttt (!tllttrl llf t4t 'Jmt.th ;itafts 
11Jagltinghm. J. (!t. 2llbi~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 16, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260 -- McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. 
Dear Lewis: 
I hope my note yesterday to John will satisfy your 
questions regarding the 90-day limitations period. 
As to the last sentence of footnote 12, in order to avoid 
the problems of misinterpretation which I understand to concern 
you, I shall rephrase the statement as follows: 
Of course, precise equivalence in culpability 
between employees is not the ultimate question: 
as we indicated in McDonnell Douglas, an 
allegation that "other employees involved in acts 
against [the employer] of comparable seriousness .•• 
were nevertheless retained .••• " is adequate to 
plead an inferential case that the employer's 
reliance on his discharged employee I s misconduct 
as grounds for terminating him was merely pretextual. 
411 U.S., at 804 (emphasis added). 
Sincerely, 
c/lf 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
tlr. Justlne Stewart 
Mr .. Juatice W;1ite 
Ur. Justioa Marshall 
Mr. Just ice Blar:Jn11tt'!'l 
Mr. Justice R'ir,qi:tst 
Mr . Ju3tice Stovcns 
From~ Mr. Justice Powell 
Circulated: JUN 1 ·, 1976 
Recirculated: _____ _ 
No. 75-260 McDONALD v. SANTE FE TRIAL CO. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting and concurring. 
In footnote 5 the Court holds that the 90-day limita-
tion on filing a charge with EEOC is not a "jurisdictional 
prerequisite". This issue, certainly not an unimportant 
one, was resolved in a footnote, and was neither assigned 
as error nor argued in this case. See McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). 
Although I express no opinion on its merits, I dissent 
from this type of judicial resolution of an important issue. 
But given the holding in footnote 5, and subject to my 
dissent, I concur in the opinion of the Court. 
CHAMB E RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN June 17, 7 
Re: No. 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am generally with you and shall at l east concur in the 
judgment. I share some of the discomfort that has been ex-
pressed by John and Lewis, particularly John's first two points 
and Lewis' distress at the last sentence in footnote 12. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss -
No. 75-260 McDONALD v. SANTA FE TRAIL CO. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting and concurring. 
In footnote 5 the Court holds that the 90-day limita-
tion on filing a charge with EEOC is not a "jurisdictional 
prerequisite". This issue, certainly not an unimportant 
one, was resolved in a footnote, and was neither assigned 
as error nor argued in this case. 
Although I express no opinion on its merits, I dissent 
from this type of judicial resolution of an important issue. 
But given the holding in footnote 5, and subject to my 
dissent, I concur in the opinion of the Court. 
• 
No. 75-260 McDONALD v. SANTA FE TRAIL CO. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the opinion of the Court except for its 
holding in footnote 5 that the 90-day limitation is not 
a "jurisdictional prerequisite". As this issue was not 
presented or argued in this case, I as fluty would not 
dispose of Ja&Bmp• x preemptorially in a single footnote, 
especially in light of a different result intimated in 
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S., at 798. 
• -~u:puntt (!Jltltrl gf i4t 'Jnitth ~fattg 
jrrut4inghm. ~ . C!J. 211.;r~, 
C H A M B ERS O F 
JUSTIC E WILLIAM H . REH NQUIST 
June 18, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
Earlier I asked that you show me as being in the 
same position as Byron with respect to your opinion for 
the Court in this case. As I indicated at Conference yesterday, 
lowever, I had not really 'addressed the ninety-day time 
period issue first noted by John in his letter to you. 
Since Harry and Lewis have now indicated their disagreement 
with the summary decision of it, I wish to reserve judgment 
on that one point for a couple of days. 
Sincerely, i/ 
~JV 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
- -~tutt Q}omt ltf tlt.t ~ttittb- ~bdtg 
Jlzudpng±ott. ~. (!}. 2llffe~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN June 18, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co. 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your short opinion dissenting in part 
and concurring in part. 
Sincerely, 
------
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 





SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl ,, . 
~ . 7, 260 
:::,, :K, McDonald and Ray-
mond L. Laird, 
Petitioners, 
, anta Fe Trail Transporta-
tion Company et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. 
[June - , 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK~ 
:MUN joins, dissenting and concurring. 
In n. 5 the Court holds that the 90-day limitation 
on filing a charge with EEOC is not a "j urisdictional 
prerequisite." This issue, certainly not an unimportant 
one, was resolveq in a footnote , and was neither assigned 
as error nor argued in this case. See McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973) ; Alexander v, 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) . 
Although I express no opinion on its merits, I dissent 
from this · type of judici1:1,,l resolution of an important 
issue. But given the holding in n, 5, and subject to my 
dissent, I concur in the opinion of the Court. 
- 2 2 1976 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ,, . 
~o. 75- 260 
I., ., ~- McDonald and Ray-
mond L. Lairdi 
Petitioner~, 
v. 
~anta Fe Trail Transporta-
tion Company et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. 
[June -, 1976] 
MR. Jus-r1cE PowELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK-, 
:M:UN joir~issenting and concurring, 
In n. 5 the Court holds that the 90-day limitation 
on filing a charge with EEOC is not a "jurisdictional 
prerequisite." . This issue, certainly not an unimportant 
one, was resolveq in a footnote , and was neither assigned 
as error nor argued in this case. See McDonnell Douglas 
Corp . v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 ( 1973); Alexander v, 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) . 
Although I express no opinion on its merits, I dissent 
from this · type of judicij:1,l resolution of an important 
issue. ~ut given the holding in n. 5, and subject to my 
dissent, I concur in the opinion of the Court. 
the Chief 
Justice and 
CHAM BE R S OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
• -.:§u:putttt <!fottd of tlrt ~ nittb ~mttg 
'Jfasfrin¼lhttt. ~. <!f. 2llffe)l., 
June 22, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260, McDonald v. Santa Fe 
Trail Transp. Co. 
Dear Thurgood, 
I would be quite happy with the deletion 
of all of footnote 5 . · 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
/ 
- -~tnu <qcnrl of tlf t ~b ~fattg 
'J)tirMJrittgtett. J. <q. 20ffe~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN June 22, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
With footnote 5 in your opinion to be eliminated, I am 
now glad to join that opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBE R S OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
.$51t+ttttttt QJ01trl cf ±qt 'J!tttittb .§utft5 
~aslfingron. IE. QJ. 2offeJ!._;1 
June 22, 1976 / 
Re: 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am de lighted to join you con gusto! 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
j;upunu Q}omt ttf tlrt ~nittb' j;fatts-
._M4ittghnt. ~. QJ. 2ll_;i)}, 
June 22, 1976 
/ 
Re: 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
On the assumption that footnote 5 will be omitted, 
I am happy to join your opinion. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBS:RS OF 




tqt ~a ~ta.ttg 
• QJ. 2llffe_,., 
June 22, 1976 
• Santa Fe Trail Trans ortation Co. 
strongly with your view that this is "not the 
ra i.lroad". I might come to the position 
but I want i.t done in accord with 
Please show me as joining in your concurring and 
dissenting opinion. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Gopie s to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
-
;§uprtmt (!Jllltrl af i4t ~th ;§taus 
jiasfri:11:ghttt. ~- OJ. 2llffe~, 
June 22, 1976 
Re: No. 75-260 - McDonald v. Santa Fe .Trail Transporta-
tion Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I shall continue to remain with Byron's position 
on your entire opinion. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
June 22, 1976 
No. 75-260 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Dear Thurgood: 
In view of the omission of footnote 5, I am happy to 
join yo opinion. 
I will withdraw my dissent. 
Many thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
- -.;§u:putttt QJou:rt of tqt ~mth .;§taftg 
1tlasqington. I9. QJ. 2llffe'l-J 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 2 2, 197 6 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 75-260 -- McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 
I am willing to make an effor t to get this case down 
on Friday in order not to hold up Potter's cases. 
I, therefore, am willing to take out all of footnote 5 
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